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We draw on three strands of literature dealing with utilization,  maintenance, and 
scrapping in order to analyze the properties of the respective policies and their interac-
tions. We do so by focusing on the last period of the received multi-period service life 
model and extending it in three directions: first, by associating the physical deteriora-
tion of equipment to the intensity of its utilization and maintenance; second, by ex-
panding on the range of explainable operating policies to allow for idling, mothballing, 
capacity depleting,  capacity preserving, full capacity, upgrading, and downgrading; 
and, third, by linking the operating policies to the capital policy of scrapping. Owing to 
these enhancements, the analysis leads to several important findings. One among 
them is that optimal operating policies depend on the properties of the operating func-
tion. If it exhibits linearities, then the operating policies jump to policies involving more 
utilization and more maintenance or vice versa. If not, then the policies develop mo-
notonously, proceeding in time from harder to softer or vice versa, depending on the 
net revenue earning capability of the equipment. Another is that profit (loss) making 
equipment is scrappable iff on the average the operating capital deteriorates faster 
(slower), or equivalently improves slower (faster), than the scrapping capital. And still an-
other result is that operating policies are determined jointly with capital policies, thus 
suggesting that empirical investigations of their determinants should allow for this si-
multaneity.  
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1. Introduction 
Owners’ decisions with respect to their durables may be classified into two cate-
gories.
2 The first concerns the decisions that are primarily directed at changing the 
condition of durables themselves and includes replacement, scrapping, expansion-
ary investment, upgrading, downgrading, overhauling and stripping. Below we shall 
refer to them as capital policies. The second category comprises the decisions that 
are associated with utilization and maintenance and we shall refer to them as operat-
ing policies.  
In Bitros and Flytzanis (2002a) we extended the multi-period service life model 
and laid down the groundwork to derive all these policies from a unified analytical 
framework based on rational economic behavior. But partly because of the over-
whelming attention they have received in the literature and partly because the pres-
entation had to be kept within reasonable limits, in that paper we placed the empha-
sis on replacement and scrapping and kept all other policies in the background. As a 
result this left for us the tasks, on the one hand, to expand the model so as to incor-
porate the remaining real capital policies, and on the other, to investigate the proper-
ties of operating policies and their interactions with capital policies. Thus, having ac-
complished recently in Bitros and Flytzanis (2002b) the former of these two tasks, 
our goal in this paper is to pursue the latter.  
  The long and arduous endeavor to integrate operating with capital policies has 
evolved along three paths. Following the trail of thoughts by Keynes (1935), the ob-
jective in the first path was to allow for the depreciation of durables due to the inten-
sity of their utilization.
 This started with the contribution by Taubman and Wilkinson 
(1970);
 Nadiri and Rosen (1974), Shapiro (1986), Bischoff and Kokkelenberg (1987), 
and Johnson (1994) developed it further; and progress peaked with the papers by 
Prucha and Nadiri (1996) and Jin and Kite-Powell (1999).
3 In the second path the 
goal was to introduce maintenance. This began with Masse (1962); it continued with 
Naslund (1966), Jorgenson, McCall and Radner (1967), and Thompson (1968); and 
while it culminated with Kamien and Schwartz (1971), the interest in it has not subsided 
because of the wide implications and significant relative size of maintenance expendi-
tures.
4 Finally, working in the third path, Bitros (1972, 1976a, 1976b) and Parks 
(1977,1979) in the 1970’s, Epstein and Denny (1980), Everson (1982) and Kim (1988) 
in the 1980’s, and Licandro and Puch (2000), Collard and Kollintzas (2000), and 
Boucekkine and Tamarit (2003), more recently, have pushed for a model of capital ser-  3
vices with endogenous utilization, maintenance and gross investment.  
From the proceeding it follows that the present paper falls in the last group of 
studies. But it differs from them in that they fail to characterize the properties of op-
erating policies and their interactions with capital policies. To substantiate this claim, 
suppose that we would like to obtain advice on the following questions. When should 
the representative firm stop operations and proceed to idle, mothball or even scrap 
its equipment? Under what conditions is it profitable to upgrade or downgrade the 
equipment? Do the analytic forms of the functions relating utilization and mainte-
nance to cash flow and equipment deterioration matter, and if so, in what way? If one 
searched for enlightenment in the literature cited above, one would not find much. 
And the same is true with the literature from such fields as operations research and 
operations management. To the best of our knowledge then, this constitutes the first 
attempt to shed light on these questions.  
Owing to the new setting, the results that emerge are quite illuminating. Unlike pre-
vious studies that led to indeterminate utilization, maintenance and service life policies, 
the ones obtained here are determinate and computable to any desired approximation.  
At his own discretion the owner may run down his equipment through more intensive 
utilization and downgrading. Technological improvements permitted under the original 
design of equipment may be incorporated gradually through upgrading. Technological 
breakthroughs generate uncertainty, which raises the effective rate of discount. If either 
of the two flow functions relating utilization and maintenance to cash flow and equipment 
wear is strictly concave, the optimal path of operating policies is in fact unique and con-
tinuous. Otherwise there may be jumps to operating policies of lower intensity, i.e. both 
lower utilization and maintenance, and vice versa. Last but not least, the owner may 
stop using his equipment and decide to: a) scrap it, b) idle it temporarily in order to 
weather unfavorable market conditions or even mothball it for use much later. 
Section 2 describes the model, the optimality conditions, and the policies. Since the 
building blocks of the model have been elaborated extensively in Bitros and Flytzanis 
(2002a, 2002b), the presentation here is meant to serve only as a vehicle to introduce 
certain clarifications and to identify the totality of operating and capital policies. In Sec-
tion 3 we obtain the general solution of the model and analyze the dependence of opti-
mal operating and capital policies on the parameters. In Section 4 we construct an ex-
ample by adopting separable specifications for the flow rate functions  . In Sec-
tion 5 we highlight the implications of our results for economic theory and policy. In Sec-
 and  rw  4
tion 6 we summarize our findings and conclusions, and, finally, in the Appendix we sup-
ply some technical material, which supplements the presentation significantly.   
 
2. The model 
2.1 Model specification 
In Bitros and Flytzanis (2002a), we examined the problem of optimal service life of 
equipment in the framework of the multi-period replacement model, allowing for any 
number of consecutive replacements to be followed by terminal scrapping. In particular, 
we examined the relation between the time durations of the consecutive replacement 
periods and the terminal scrapping period. Furthermore, we related the above to the 
case of steady state replacements at equal time intervals. Here we concentrate only in 
one period of operations, which leads to scrapping. In fact in our previous work we 
showed that very often the optimal policy is that of scrapping without replacement, and 
further that even when it is optimal to replace, the last scrapping period is where most of 
the profit is made.
5  In this scrapping period the objective for the owner of the equipment 
may be stated as follows: 
0
00
                  Choose    so as to maximize :              
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where the various symbols are defined as follows: 
0 (, , )()
T
Qq u m K φ td t =∫
  : Expected net operating revenue for operating horizon T. 
():   KK tUsed equipment measured in efficiency units, reflecting its size and age since 
first put in operation. New or unused equipment will be denoted by KK.   0 (0) =
():   u u t Utilization intensity relative to some extremal values, with 01 .      u
     Maintenance intensity expressed as expense relative to some extremal 
values, with  .  
( ):   m m t
01    m
        (u  Operating policy factors.  , : m)
(, , ) qumK :  Flow of net operating revenue.  
  s(  Flow of net capital wear   ,, u m K):  5
          (q  Operating policy flows.   , : s)
, T SS ( K T = ) : Scrap value of used equipment at T .  For the scrap value of unused equip-
ment we set SS . 00 0 ( K , = )
6  
   φ :  Effective discount factor. Let  denote the probability of a techno-
logical breakthrough by time t, with 
− =
σt (t) e F(t)
0 0 F( ) =  and   for all t . As-
suming a constant discount rate 
1 F(t)<
ρ, the discount factor would be  . 
To account for technological uncertainty this is multiplied by  . 
In keeping with the specification of time invariance, we consider only 
the usual exponential case: 
ρt e





. Then, since  , 
the effect of uncertainty is equivalent to introducing a revised effective 
discount rate, expressed by σθ .  
(θρ )t −+ φ(t) e =
 
Expression (1) describes the general setting of an optimal control problem.  We will pro-
ceed with a more specific model by assuming   and   of the following type:   q s
   : Where   is the operating net revenue rate.  Usually positive, but 
it can also be negative.  Increasing in u, decreasing in m, concave in (u, m).  
ε qr K = , rr ( u m = )
)    sw: Where ww  is the capital stock wear rate. Increasing in u, de-
creasing in m, convex in ( . It expresses the effect on equipment of 
maintenance and usage, including aging. Usually positive but it can 
also be negative, if aging causes upgrading or if investment type of 
maintenance overbalances the wear of equipment, allowing K  to even 
rise above the original K .  
K = , ( u m =
u,m)
0
(w,r): Operating policy rates 
These rate functions characterize the operating features of the equipment. They 
have been taken to be time invariant. However, we will allow time variations for the 
prices, of the constant percentage type, by setting:  
 Sp : Scrap value of equipment at time T , where:  
ηT e K =
     η: Relative rate of price change. It is the difference between equipment 
price change and operating revenue price change, because any com-
mon part can be subtracted from the discount rate  . It can have either 
sign, or be zero.  
σ  6
With the help of these specifications, we will investigate the dependence on the parame-
ters  , of: a) the operating policies defined by the optimal rates of utilization 
and maintenance as functions of time: 
0 ,,,, {εσηpK }
, {u u(t)m m(t)} = = , and b) the scrapping policy 
defined by the optimal duration T .  
∗
 
2.2 Policy types. 
Concerning scrapping policy, we will say that the equipment is nonprofitable, if T 0
∗ = , 
scrappable, if 0 , and durable, if T T
∗ << ∞
∗ =∞. 
 As for the operating policies we refer to Figure 1(a) below. We will say that a policy 
pair v:  is of:  ( u , m)
 
Higher intensity, if both utilization and maintenance are higher, 
Lower intensity, if both utilization and maintenance are lower. 
 
In this ordering, we distinguish the two extremal policies, of lowest and highest intensity: 
 
                         vu   & vu 0 :( 0 , 0) m == 1 :( 1 , 1 ) m = = . 
 
More important is their ordering according to the resultant wear-revenue rates: 
.  We will say that a policy pair is:   (w,r)
 
Harder, if it gives higher rates both for wear and revenue,  
Softer, if it gives lower rates both for wear and revenue. 
 
In this ordering, we distinguish the two extremal policies: 
7  
 
:( 0 , 1 ) vu m == : Softest, with the lowest rates: (w,r ) 
:( 1 , 0) vu m == : Hardest with the highest rates: (w   ,r )
 
Moreover, we will say that a policy pair (w  is:   ,r)
 
Profit making, if r , loss making, if  > 0 < 0 r ,  
Downgrading, if w , upgrading, if  0 > w0 <   
Break even of zero revenue, if  = 0 r ,  
Capacity preserving of zero wear, if  = 0 w . 
  
 
For particular equipment any of the above policy types may or may not be available. 
Classifying equipment according to the totality of the available policies, we say that it is:   7
Profit making, if r , loss making if  0 ≥ r0 ≤ ,  
Revenue-flexible,  if both profit making and loss making policies are 
available, 
Downgrading, if w , upgrading, if w 0 ≥ 0 ≤ ,   
Wear- flexible, if both upgrading and downgrading policies are available. 
 
Finally, we will say that the equipment is: 
 
Special, if it has policies that are both profit making and upgrading 
at the same time, 
Common, if it is not special. 
 
We will find that the equipment behaves differently depending mainly on its revenue type.  
 
Remark 1  
Referring to various policy types, in practice we often use the following terminology: 
1. Among the minimal utilization policies:  0 u = , we distinguish the following: 
(i) Closedown, with no maintenance. It is the policy of lowest intensity: 
0 :( 0 , 0) vu m = =  
(ii) Idling, with some maintenance (0 , 0 um ) = > .
8  
(iii) Mothballing, with full maintenance. It is the softest policy: 
:( 0 , 1 ) vu m = = ,  
      with the lowest rates: (w . ,r )
9 
2. Among the maximal utilization policies:  1 u = , we distinguish the following: 
(i)  Capacity depleting, with no maintenance. It is the hardest policy: 
:( 1 , 0) vu m = = , 
       with the highest rates: (w,r ).
10 
(ii)  Full capacity, with maximal maintenance. It is the policy of highest intensity 
1 :( 1 , 1 ) vu m = = .
11  
 
2.3 Two revenue based measures of capital 
We examine first some preliminary notions that will help us interpret the results. We 
start by distinguishing the two sources of revenue, the operating revenue and the scrap 
revenue.  The capacity of capital to produce these two revenues is affected by operations 
and also by time discounting. But their effects are exercised in different ways, as follows: 
 
Remark 2 
1.  Concerning the effect of operations on the two revenues, we have: 
  : Deterioration rate of operating revenue, of either sign.               q/q εw −=  
  : Deterioration rate of scrapping revenue, of either sign.   S/S w η −= −  
We note that if  , then operations affect the services more than the equipment, 
after we account for price changes due to  . The opposite is the case if ε . 
1 ε >
η 1 <
2. Concerning the effect of time discounting, we note that for the same operating 
policies, K units of capital at time T  are equivalent presently to: 
− =⇒ =
εε σ T σT/ε
oc oc rK rK e K Ke
−  capital units for operating revenue.   8
− =⇒ =
ηT σT ση )T
sc sc pK pKe e K Ke
− − ( capital units for scrapping revenue. 
Thus, we have two discounting rates for future capital: 
  : Discounting rate for operating revenue, positive  σ / ε
ση − : Discounting rate for scrapping revenue, of either sign. 
     We note that if ε , then future capital is more heavily discounted for its 
scrap value than for its services, after accounting for the price changes due to 
. The opposite is the case if 
1 >
η <1 ε . 
3. We can summarize these differences by considering two measures of capital: 
               : Scrapping capital, determining the scrap revenue.   K
ε K : Operating capital, determining the operating revenue, 
where as noted above ε  is the deterioration (improvement) coefficient for the 
services rendered by the equipment relative to the downgrading (upgrading) of 
the equipment itself. 
4.  At the beginning of the operating period the unit prices of the two capital meas-
ures are defined respectively by: 
00 0 λ pK / K p ==
0
ε
: Owner’s unit logistic value for new scrapping capital. 
1
00 0
ε µp K / Kp K
− == : Owner’s unit logistic value for new operating capital. 
If   is fixed, i.e. if it is not a parameter, then we can choose capital units and also 
adjust  , so that the two initial values are equal: 
0 K
r 00 0 1 K λ µp = ⇒==  
 
The main results so far can be summarized as follows: 
 
Remark 3.   
1. Scrapping policy is determined mainly by the deterioration rates:{   εw, w η } −
2. Operating policies are determined mainly by the discount rates:    { σ / ε,ση } −
3. In all cases the policies depend on whether the price   is “low” or  “high”.  p
. 
2.4 Optimality conditions  
Examining the problem in the setting of optimal control theory, we consider the total 
profit flow given by the current value Hamiltonian: 
 
ε 1 εε H[ q ( u , m ) K λs(u,m)K ] [q(u,m) λKs ( u , m ) ] K
− =−= − , 
 
with co-state variable 
 
                     : Owner’s unit logistic value for scrapping capital.  λλ t () =
 
In place of  , we have also the pair  { , } H λ { , } h µ , where 
 
ε hH K r u m µwum /( , ) ( , == − ) : Total profit flow rate per unit of operating capital  
 
ε µ λKK / = : Owner’s unit logistic value for operating capital 
 
From Leonard & Van Long (1995) or Seierstadt & Sydsaeter (1986), we obtain the 
following necessary conditions for optimality:
12   9
(i). For the operating policies (  the maximality principle:  um , )
           
         
u,m u,m maxH max{h [q(u,m) µs(u,m)]    u ,   m } 01 0 ⇒= − ≤ ≤ ≤   1 ≤             
 
(ii). For the capital stock:  
 
Ks u m K (, ) =   ,  with K −initial condition K K0 (0) =                                 (2) 
 
(iii). For the logistic value: 
 
                      K λ H σλ ′ =− +   µ εh σµ εµ σε hµ (/ / ⇒= −+ = −   )
)
                                                   
               with T final condition:  − TK T λ SKT (, ′ =   
ηT ε
TT µ pe K
1− ⇒=                                                        
 
(iv). For the duration, the scrapping H −terminal condition: 
                                           
                                           H T σSS ′ =−   h µ ση / − ⇒=                                                                
 
The solution will be obtained by the following procedure. First we solve the maximality 
principle 3(i), to express {u  as functions of  ,m} µ. Then for given duration T  we solve 
the autonomous dynamical equation 3(iii) for µ. This gives the optimal solution for given 
. For T  we find  0 T: T << ∞ 0 → 00 hr 0 0 µ w = − , and we consider the initial condition:  
 
   : Profitability condition         (3)             00 0 0 (0) ( ,0) ( ,0) / ( ) T H σSK S K h µ ση ′ >− ⇒ > −
 
 
If it is not satisfied then the optimal duration is zero: T 0
∗ = , and the equipment is non-
profitable.
13 If it is satisfied then it is profitable, and we consider two possibilities. If the 
terminal condition 1(iv) does not have solution, then the optimal duration is un-
bounded:T , and the equipment is durable. If it has solution, then the equipment is 
∗ =∞
scrappable,
14 and we take the first such solution as the scrapping duration T . s T
∗ =
15 In 
this case we examine also the operating policies.  
As can be seen from the conditions, pivotal role is played by the quantity: 
 
          : Total profit index                                             (4)  iH / λKh / µ ==
 
It expresses the total profit flow per unit logistic value of capital, expressed either in 
terms of the operating capital or in terms of the scrapping capital.
16   10
3. Equipment characteristics 
3.1 Optimal path 
The maximality principle 3(i) determines for given µ the optimal (u policies.  
By convex programming and by the monotonicity properties of the functions involved, 
the totality of available optimal policies can be obtained also as solutions of either of the 
following constrained optimization problems, where the Lagrange multiplier of the first 








     0 1 0 1 , for any       
   0 1 0 1 ,  for any         
u,m
u,m
max{ r(u,m) w(u,m) w, u , m } w
min{w(u,m) r(u,m) r, u , m } r 
              (5) 
    
They can be characterized as follows: 
 
Remark 4 
1. Among the policies that give the same rate of capital wear, optimal are those 
that maximize the rate of operating revenue, and 
2. Among the policies that give the same rate of operating revenue, optimal are those 
that minimize the rate of capital wear.  
 
Actually the above constrained optimization problems determine pairs of optimal rates: 
.  As indicated in Figure 1(a), for each such pair the contact points of their isorate 
curves in the (u  plane give the corresponding policies, or else they are boundary. 
These points form a path in the (u  plane, which we will call optimal path. In general, 
each contact consists of a single point and then the optimal path is uniquely determined 
and continuous. In special cases, it may be only upper-semicontinuous, with portions 
where the policies are not uniquely determined, in the sense that they give the same 
 values. In practice, these appear as discontinuity jumps to policies of higher or 





  AB µ increases, the optimal path moves from 
harder to softer policies. On the average this will lead also to lower utilization and higher 
maintenance. However we may have portions of the path where it leads to policies of 
higher or lower intensity.  
 
3.2 Operating function 
The constrained maximization problem determines the maximal revenue rate that can 
be obtained for given wear rate, and defines a maximal value function, which we will call:   11
rr w () = : Operating function. 
 
It is concave increasing. In Figure 1(b) we give the graphs for two such functions, 
corresponding to revenue flexible and wear flexible equipment, of the special type 
and of the common type, respectively.  
The generalized derivative of the operating function measures the extra revenue 
that can be obtained per unit of increase in the wear rate. It will be called 
 
r w dr dw () / ′ = : Substitution rate 
 
It is positive decreasing in w . It defines the Lagrange multiplier of the constrained 
maximization problem and it coincides with  .  Considering the ordering of policies  µ
according to their hardness, we have the extremal values:
17  
 
        rr ( w ) ′′ =≤ + ∞ : Highest substitution rate at the softest policy: wr ) (,  
         0 rr ( w ) ′′ =≥ : Lowest substitution rate at the hardest policy: wr) (,  
 
Thus for given   in this range, the corresponding optimal policies are determined by 
the relation: 
µ
                                           ( µr w ) ′ = : Operating policy function. 
 
The operating function   may have corners with discontinuous derivative, and  rr ( w = )  12
linear parts with constant derivative. As µ changes continuously along the curve of the 
operating function, it will stay for a finite duration at the corners of the operating func-
tion waiting to cover the derivative discontinuity. They will be called stable or persis-
tent policies. The nonstable policies can be called transient.  Also it will skip the lin-
ear parts that have constant substitution rate, jumping to milder or harder policies, 
depending on the direction, and occasionally to policies of lower or higher intensity. 
They will be called skipped policies. The extremal policies are usually stable policies. 
In actual practice operating functions are expected to be piecewise linear, consisting 
of a few alternative stable policies, the rest being skipped.  Summarizing, we can 







Lemma 1.  Logistic value 
1. For given 
1 ε µ λK
− = , the optimal wear-revenue pair (,  is the one for which 
the substitution rate coincides with the unit operating capital logistic value 
wr )
µ : 
                       rr w r w µ {( ) , ( ) ′ = = {( ) , ( ww ) } µ rr µ ⇒= = ,                    
     if this rate is attained, i.e. if  r r ′ ′ ≤ .  If it is not attained, i.e. if the value of 
µ  is outside the range of available substitution rates then it is the correspond-
ing most extremal rates policy, i.e. the hardest or the softest.    
2. As µ  changes the policies move along the curve of the operating function. 
They move to softer policies if µ  increases, to harder policies if µ  decreases, 
persisting at the stable policies, and skipping the skipped policies.  
 
 
From now on we will be working only with optimal policies, as determined by the operat-
ing function rr , since it summarizes all the relevant characteristics of the equip-
ment. In this context, an optimal policy can be determined by any of the three quantities: 
( w = )
 
                        µ wr :( , ), where − ≤+ ∞ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ µ ,w w w,r r r . 
 
We note that all negative  values correspond to the hardest policy:  µ −
 
                                  :  0 µ ≤ (w .   ,r ) u 1,m 0) ⇒= =
 
If the equipment is wear flexible, then it has a capacity preserving policy of zero wear 
with the corresponding revenue and substitution rates:                                              
                                              .  :( 0 , )
ww µw r
 
Similarly, if the equipment is revenue flexible then it has a break-even policy of zero 
revenue, with corresponding wear and substitution rates:   13
                                              :( , 0)
rr µw r = . 
 
If these policies are stable then we will actually have a whole interval of correspond-
ing  values. We note the following:  µ −
 
Remark 5 
 If the equipment is revenue flexible, then: 
1. A policy is profit making if 
r µ µ < , loss making if 
r µ µ > .   
2.The equipment is special if the break-even policy is upgrading: w , com-






The above refer to the operating characteristics of the equipment. What part of the 
operating function will actually be covered and in what direction is determined by the 
parameters  . The solution depends on the properties of the total profit 
index, which we examine next.   
0 {ε,σ,η,p,K }
 
3.3 Total profit index 
Substituting from the maximality principle we can express the total profit index as 
function of  :  µ
                              =− ⇒ = =−
h(µ) r(µ)




For   it is always the profit index of the hardest policy and is given by the hyperbola:  0 µ ≤
 
                                                     ir µ w / = − . 
 
Note that for  , negative index indicates positive total profit flow. For  , it de-
pends on the revenue type of the equipment, as indicated in the Appendix. In Figure 2 
below we give the graph of the index function for equipment of various revenue types. In 
each case the position of the 
0 µ < µ 0 ≥
µ axis where i 0 = , depends on the signs of 
r www , } {, ,  
i.e. on the wear type. We have placed it for the case of wear flexible equipment. The 
main characteristics can be summarized as follows: 
 
Lemma 2. Total profit index. 
As the policies soften with increasing  , the total profit index decreases if the 
policies are profit making, it increases if they are loss making. In particular, for 
equipment of the revenue flexible type we distinguish a critical 
µ
− µ value given by   14
the substitution rate at the break even optimal policy: 
                                                  :( , 0)
rr µw r =  
where the policies change from profit making to loss making and the total profit 
index attains its smallest value: 
                                                        
rr iw = −  




Using the total profit index function we can rephrase the optimality conditions (1) 
and (2) as follows: 
 
         (i).  For operating policies: {r r(w), r (w) µ} {w w(µ), r r(µ)} ′ = =⇒= =  
         (ii). For capital stock:  () Kw µ K =   , with initial condition KK 0 (0) =                               
        (iii). For logistic value:  , with final condition:  µ εµ[σ / ε i(µ)] =−   1 ηT ε
TT µ pe K
− =          (6) 
       (iv). For duration, the terminal scrapping condition:  T i(µ ) ση = − . 




ε µ pK . 
 
We will proceed now to the solution, investigating first the question of profitability, 
then the operating policies and finally the scrapping policy.  
 
4.1 Profitability. 
For given duration T , the T optimal solution is determined by the T final con-
dition: 
− −
                                      
ηT
T λ pe =⇒
ηT ε
TT µp e K
1− =    15
In particular, for T  the price of new equipment determines a   value and corre-
sponding policy, by: 
0 → µ
0 λ p = ⇒
1
00
ε µ pK :
− =  (w   00 ,r )
 
It is the optimal policy to be applied if the equipment is to be operated for very short 
time duration. The initial profitability condition (3) is written as: 
 
                                            where   0( σηip −< ) 00 () ( ) ip i µ =  
             
Graphically, it is given by the region below the positive part:  of the graph of the 
index function 
0 µ >




ε p µ K , on the horizontal. Τhe position of the  − p axis where   depends on 
the sign of the terms 
0 −= ση
r www , , { }, i.e. on the wear properties of the equipment. In Fig-
ure 3, we have placed it for the case of wear flexible equipment. We can summarize 




Proposition 1. Profitability 
For given price  , the equipment is profitable if the scrapping capital discount 
rate is smaller than the total profit index of new capital:  
p







⇒>+ − . 
 
We note in particular, that if the equipment is of the revenue flexible type, then there 
is a critical price, given by: 
1
0
cr ε pµ K
− = , such that the equipment behaves like the   16
profit making type if its price is lower, like the loss making type if its price is higher. 
We will say that the price is: low if  <
c p p , high if  >




TT η µ ) ] µp =
ε σ ( 1 1 /
)
ε σ ( 1 1 /
)
ε σ ( 1 1 /
 
Remark 6  
For revenue flexible equipment, low prices are characterized by the property that 
short duration optimal policy is profit making, while high prices are characterized 
by the fact that short duration optimal policy is loss making. Extending this notion 
we can say, by convention, that for profit making equipment all prices are “low”, 
while for loss making equipment all prices are “high”.  
  
 
4.2 Operating policies.  
During the operating period the  value develops according to equation 6(iii). 
This determines the operating policies on the operating function   according 
to equation 6(i).  Recalling that larger 
rr ( w =
values correspond to softer policies, we will 
investigate, for scrappable equipment: a) the shift to softer or harder operating poli-
cies as time passes, and b) the range of applied operating policies: 
.  µ µ(t) µ w w(t) w,r r(t) ≥≥ ⇒ ≤≤≤   
)
Concerning time development, we note that equation 6(iii) is autonomous, and 
since  µ is continuous it will move in time monotonously. The sign of the derivative µ 
determines the direction of monotonicity at any time, in particular at the terminal time T , 
if the equipment is scrappable.  Substituting from 6(iv), we find:  
  




− > . 
  
Hence the monotonicity property depends on the relative magnitude of the two dis-
count rates: {σ / ε, ση } − . We have: 
 
Proposition 2a.  Time shift of operating policies 
If the equipment is scrappable, then we distinguish the following cases: 
1. If σε , i.e. if the operating discount is higher than the 
scrapping discount, then   increases in time from harder to softer policies 





2. If σε , i.e. if the operating discount is lower than the 
scrapping discount, then   decreases in time from softer to harder policies. 
σ η η / <−⇒<−
µ(t
3. If σε , i.e. if the operating discount and the scrapping 
discount are equal, then  stays fixed in time at the equilibrium policy. 
σ η η / =−⇒=−
µ(t)
 
Thus the equipment is worked harder at the beginning if the operating discount is 
larger than the scrapping discount, and conversely. We note however that the wear-  17
revenue flows:  ,  , depend not only on how hard the equipment is 
worked but also on K  itself.    
ε qr K = sw K =
Regarding the range of applied policies we consider the dynamics of the equa-
tion 6(iii) and we locate: 
1. The fixed  − µ values, if they exist, given by the policies with profit index 
equal to the operating capital discount rate:  
                     ( ) / :( , ) ee e i µ σε µw r =⇒ :  Equilibrium solutions                 
2. The scrapping  values, if they exist, given by the policies with profit 
index equal to the scrapping capital discount rate: 
− µ
                    () 0 : ( ,) ss i s µ ση µw =−⇒ > r : Scrapping solutions  
We have restricted the scrapping solutions to be positive because they 
satisfy also the T final condition 2(iii):  −
1 0
ηT ε
TT µp e K
− = > . 
We note now that as we increase the operating duration T ,  T µ  moves about 
along the positive part of the total profit index curve: , starting from  0 µ> µ0 . The 
equipment will be scrappable if it meets  s µ , durable if it does not.  In particular it is 
durable if there is no scrapping solution. From the graph of the index function we find 
that if the equipment is of the profit making type or of the loss making type then there 
is at most one scrapping solution. In these cases there is also at most one positive 
equilibrium solution which is unstable repelling if the equipment is of the profit making 
type, stable attractive if it is of the loss making type. Since the flow is always from the 
nearest repelling equilibrium or repelling extremal value towards the scrapping value, 
we conclude the following: 
 
Proposition 2b. Bounds on the operating policies  
For scrappable equipment the applied policies are bounded at the terminal scrapping 
time by the scrapping value. At the initial time they are bounded as follows: 
1. If the equipment is of the profit making type, then initially they are bounded by the 
equilibrium value, unless there is no equilibrium value in which case they are ini-
tially bounded by the extremal softest policy. This happens if the extremal softest 
policy is upgrading and the operating capital discount is sufficiently low: 
                                       << 0 and / σε w − w  
2.  If the equipment is of the loss making type, then initially they are bounded by an 
extremal policy, as follows: 
     (i) The extremal softest policy if σε σ η η ε σ / (1 1/ ) < −⇒<− . 
     (ii) The extremal hardest policy if σε σ η η ε σ / (1 1/ ) >−⇒>−  
3.  If the equipment is of the revenue flexible type then: 
     (i) If its price is low then it behaves like the profit making type with   replac-
r w  18
ing w  
     (ii) If its price is high then it behaves like the loss making type in case 2(i) above, 
while in case 2(ii) it is bounded initially by the profit making equilibrium policy 
instead of the hardest. 
 
Proof.  
Parts 1 and 2 are direct consequences of the dynamics and the properties of the 
index function. In these cases depending on the value of   we obtain the 
flows in the diagrams of Figure 4 below. Concerning part 3, we note that if the 
equipment is of the revenue flexible type, and 
σ / ε
ση −  is in the range: 
                                             
r w ση w − < − −< , 
then there will be two scrapping solutions, one profit making the other loss mak-
ing as follows: 
                           
12 r
ss profit making : µ µµ : l o s s m a k i n << g  
We note however that in this case, the profitability assumption gives: 








if the price is low :







µ µµ : µµ  
 
 
   
 
Hence as  T µ  moves about starting from  0 µ , it will hit first, if any, the profit making 
value 
1
s µ  in the first case, the loss making value 
2
s µ  in the second case. Thus, the 
terminal scrapping operating policy is uniquely defined in this case also. It is hard 
profit making if the price is low, soft loss making if the price is high.
18  The rest fol-
lows as in 1 and 2 with some minor modifications, as indicated.  
The above are the best possible bounds on the operating policies for scrappable 
equipment. We note also that the bounds given by the terminal and the initial policy 
have well defined wear and revenue properties. Hence, the corresponding properties for 
the operating policies are determined by noting that for small durations they stay close   19
to the terminal policy, and as the duration increases they spend increasing amount of 
time close to the initial policy before ending at the terminal policy, in accordance with the 
general turnpike property.  
 
4.3 Scrapping policy 
For the above results to be relevant we proceed now to determine the scrapping pol-
icy, i.e. under what conditions we have scrapping and what is the scrapping duration. 
For this we will need the bounds on operating policies for scrappable equipment ob-
tained above. We note first that a profitable equipment is durable if the scrapping condi-
tion 6(iv) does not have solutions. If it has solutions, then we can determine uniquely 
the terminal  s µ  value as indicated above. If the equipment is scrappable, then the 
operating policies will be bounded by: www ≤ ≤ , as indicated above.  
In this case, the solution is determined by the terminal value  s µ  and the scrap-
ping duration T . We define the quantity: 
 







= ∫ ω : Average wear rate, w ω w ≤ ≤ .       
 
   Proposition 3.  Scrapping policy 
We consider equipment K  of unit price , with coefficient ε  and operating func-
tion rr , with 
0 p
( w = ) www ≤≤, and we compute: 
                           r( : Operating policy function,   w) µ ′ =
                             i : Total profit index function.  (µ) r(µ)/ µ w(µ) =−





The equipment is profitable if  
                                   ση .  0 i( p ) −<
In this case the scrapping policy depends on the revenue type as follows: 
1.  If the equipment is of the profit making type, we distinguish two cases: 
(i).  If ση w −< −, then it ιs durable for any price    p
(ii). If  0 w σηi( p ) −<−< , then it is scrappable iff on the average the operating 
capital deteriorates strictly faster or equivalently improves strictly slower 
than the scrapping capital. Thus, it is: 
      (a). Durable if  .   (1 ) εω ω η η ε ω ≤− ⇒≤−
      (b). Scrappable if  .   (1 ) εω ω η η ε ω >− ⇒>−
                 In the last case we compute also the scrapping value: ,  s i(µ) ση µ =−⇒
                 and then the scrapping duration is given by:  








T ,  where εω ,  , and w . 
εω ω η µ
=
−−
ω η >− 0 s µµ > ω w ≤≤  
2. If the equipment is of the loss making type with ση 0 i( p ) − < , then it is scrap-
pable iff on the average the scrapping capital deteriorates strictly faster or   20
equivalently improves strictly slower than the operating capital. Thus, it is: 
    (i). Durable if  .   (1 ) ωηε ω η ε ω −≤ ⇒≥−
    (ii). Scrappable if ωη .   (1 ) ε ω η ε ω −> ⇒<−
          In the last case we compute also the scrapping value:i( s µ) ση µ = −⇒ , 
          and then the scrapping duration is given by:   






T ,  where 
ωη ε ω µ
=
−−
ωηε ω − > ,  0 s µ µ < , and  w .  ω w ≤≤  
3. If the equipment is of the revenue flexible type, we compute also the following:  
                          w : Break even wear rate, 
r
                            : Critical price, where   
1
0
cr ε pµ K
− =
rr µr ( w ′ = )
    Then: 
     (i) If   then it is durable for any price   
r ση w −< − p
     (ii) If  , then it behaves like the profit making equipment if its 
price is lower than the critical price, like the loss making equipment if its 
price is higher than the critical price. 
0
r w σηi( p ) −< − <
 
Proof.   
For parts 3.1(i), 3.3(i) we simply note that under these conditions there is no scrap-
ping solution. For the rest we note that if the equipment is scrappable then the solu-
tion will be determined by the terminal scrapping value  s µ  and the scrapping dura-
tion T . We note now that a solution of duration T  will give final capital stock: 









= ∫ ω : average wear rate, w   ω w ≤≤  
The solution will be optimal if the final values  TT µ K {, }  satisfy relations 6(iii) and 6(iv)  
  
ηT ε
TT µ pe K





1/(1 ) /(1 )
00 (/)
εη T ε





Hence it will be scrappable iff the two functions   and   coincide for some 
, which will also be the scrapping duration.  We will proceed only with case of 
Proposition 3.1. In this case the index function is decreasing and the profitability 
condition can be written: 
KT () T K
T
                          ση 0 () s iµ µ µ − <⇒ > , because iµ ( ) s ση = −   
          We consider the two capital functions: 
10 () ()
ωT KT K T K e
− == and 
1/(1 ) /(1 )
20 0 () ( / )
εη T ε
Ts KT K µ µ K e
− −− == , with  0 s µ µ > . 
We will examine separately the three cases depending on the ε −value:   
1. If  , then  , and hence K(  meets K(  iff   1 ε < 12 0 K( ) K( ) < 0 1 T) 2 T )
  11 ωη /( ε ) η ( ε )ω −> − − ⇒>−  
2. If  , then  , and hence K(  meets K(  iff   1 ε > 12 0 K( ) K( ) > 0 1 T) 2 T)
  11 ωη /( ε ) η ( ε )ω −< − − ⇒>−  
3. If ε , then it is scrappable iff  1 = 0
ηT
Ts µ µe µ = =  for some T , which happens 
iff η .  0 >
 
The conditions and the formulas obtained can be verified in the simple case where 
the applied policy is fixed: ww . In the general case they can be used to provide 
easily applicable sufficient conditions, as follows: 
0 −=  
   21
Corollary 1  
1. If it is profit making with  0 w σηi( p ) −<−<
0 i( p )
 or if it is revenue flexible with low 
price and  , then it is profitable and: 
r w ση −< − <
    (i). It is durable if (a).   and ε 1 ε ≤ wwη ≤ −  or  (b). ε  and  .  1 ≥ εwwη ≤−   
   (II). It is scrappable if (a). ε  and ε  or (b).   and    .  1 ≤ wwη >−   1 ε ≥ εwwη >−
2. If it is loss making with   or if it is revenue flexible with high price 
and  , then it is profitable, and: 
0 σηi( p ) −<
0
r w σηi( p ) −< − <
    (i).  It is durable if (a).   and ε  or  (b). ε  and  .  1 ε ≤ wwη ≥−   1 ≥ εwwη ≥−
    (II). It is scrappable if (a). ε 1 ≤  and εwwη < −  or (b).   and  .  1 ε ≥ εwwη <−   
  
4.4 Parameter dependence 
  We have ascertained that the operating and scrapping policies depend on the 
quantities: 




− = ,  ss i( s µ) ση µ: ( w, r) =−⇒ ,  = ⇒ ee e i(µ) σ / ε µ: ( w, r)  
From the monotonicity properties of the profit index function we obtain the following 
general results. More specific results can be obtained in special cases. 
 
Proposition 4. Parameter dependence 
1. If the equipment is profit making or revenue flexible with low price, then: 
    (i). If scrappable, then the operating policies harden if ση −  or σ  increase.  / ε
    (ii). The scrapping duration is p −decreasing. Also it is σ − decreasing if ε .   1 ≥
2. If the equipment is loss making or revenue flexible with high price, then:  
    (i). If scrappable, then the operating policies soften if ση −  increases. 
    (ii). The scrapping duration is p −increasing. Also it is σ − decreasing if  .   1 ε ≤
 
5. Special cases 
5.1 The case    1 ε =
  The conditions and the bounds obtained for the scrapping policy become 
more determinate as 
                      (1 , i.e. as ε , or as  ε ww )( ) 0 −− →   1 → 0 ww − → . 
In fact for  , they become completely determinate, as follows:  1 ε =
 
Corollary 2.  
We consider profitable equipment for which the scrapping capital and the operat-
ing capital coincide:  .   1 ε =
1. If it is profit making with  0 w σηi( p ) −<−<
0 i( p ) <
 or if it is revenue flexible with low 
price and  , then it is scrappable iff  , and then the 
scrapping duration is: 
r w ση −< − 0 η >








= T , where η  and  .  0 > 0 s µµ >  22
2.  If it is loss making with ση  or if it is revenue flexible with high price and 
, then it is scrappable iff 
0 i( p ) −<
0
r w σηi( p ) −< − < 0 η < , and then the scrapping dura-
tion is: 








η µ η µ
==
−
T , where  0 η < and  0 s µµ < . 
 
Remark 5  
Consider Figure 5 below. In all cases, for given price  , we distinguish a nonprofit-
able region of high   values, an intermediate profitable region with mixed poli-
cies, both scrappable and durable depending on the sign of  , and a profitable re-
gion of low   values with durable policy.  We note that as   decreases 
crossing these critical values there may appear discontinuities in the duration.  Thus 





ση − ση −
() p ∞ . We note also that for each 
fixed   the revenue flexible type has the maximal scrapping duration:  η
                                        
00
11








η µ η µ
== . 
But when   crosses the critical value  ση −
r w − , it jumps to T = ∞ . As remarked pre-
viously these discontinuities are caused by our specification that due to the effect of 
obsolescence risk the operator does not accept revenue reduction and stops at the 





5.2 An example: linear operating function 
We will compute the solution quantities for equipment with only two stable policies, a 
soft upgrading and loss making: (0 ,0 wr) < < , and a hard downgrading and profit making: 
(0 ,0 wr >> ) .  The remaining are skipped policies. In this case the revenue rate will be a   23
linear increasing function of the wear rate: 
                                                     r αw β = + . 
The equipment is revenue flexible and wear flexible.  In Figure 6 we give the diagrams of 
the operating function and of the profit index function for  , separately for the special 




For convenience we take K00 0 1 λ µ =⇒ = = p , and we find: 
1.  Operating function:  ()






















,   
  
3.  Total profit index:  {/ } , { / }
rr ir µ wi fµ µ r µ wi fµ µ =− ≤ − ≥  
 






iw , negative if common, positive if special. 
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Concerning applied optimal policies, we note the following: 
 






rpwση if the price is low p p
σηip
rp w ησ if the price is high p p
 >+− ≤
< ⇒ 
−< − + − ≥ 








 then it is profitable and durable for all p.  
 
The remaining policies depend in more particular ways on the parameters. We will exam-
ine some special cases. 
 
8. We assume ε 1 = . Then: 
(i) If the price is low   and if  <
c pp 0()
r rw rw r
w σηip ση w
rr p
−
− <−< ⇒ <−<−
−
, 















(ii) If the price is high: 
c p p > , and if  0()
r rw rw r
w σηip ση w
rr p
−
− <−< ⇒ <−<−
−
, 















9. Under certain conditions we can have shifts between the two policies, the hard and 
the soft. In particular: 
(i). If the price is low, then the terminal policy will be the hard policy. However as 
indicated in part 3a of Proposition 3a, if 
< <− 0 and /
rr w σε w  
i.e. if it is special and   is sufficiently low, then as the price  σ / ε p decreases 
the scrapping duration will increase according to proposition 4 and hence it 
will spend initially increasing amount of time close to the initial soft policy be-
fore switching to the hard policy at the end.  
(ii). Similarly if the price is high, then the terminal policy will be necessarily the 
soft policy. However as indicated in part 3b of Proposition 3a, if  
/ σε σ η >− , 
then by Proposition 4 as the price p increases the scrapping duration will 
also increase and it will spend increasing amount of time close to the initial 
hard policy before switching to the soft policy at the end.   25
6 Implications for economic theory and policy 
  Recent efforts to integrate operating and capital policies in a unified analytical 
framework leave much to be desired. The reason being that the proposed models are 
founded invariably on the presumption that the representative firm adopts a capital pol-
icy of perpetual replacements at equal time intervals, even though market conditions 
during certain periods may recommend terminal scrapping. So what we want to do in 
this section is to highlight the implications of our results by reference to three areas of 
contemporary research.   
 
6.1 New theories of economic growth and real business cycles 
Consider, for example, the model presented by Boucekkine and Tamarit (2003).
19 
The view taken by these authors is that the representative firm chooses utilization 
and maintenance, along with gross investment and labor, in order to maximize the 
present value of an infinite stream of profits, subject to the usual accumulation constraint 
in which capital depreciates at a positive rate. In this framework it can be shown that 
maximization over an infinite horizon is equivalent to assuming that the representative firm 
plans for a perpetual series of equidistant investments having infinite service lives. But 
when capital goods are durable, the policies of utilization and maintenance may not 
be well defined, particularly in the multi-period setting of the model. Consequently 
their specifications may be seriously flawed. 
That this is most likely the case can be ascertained by reference to the difficulties 
that the authors encountered in obtaining coherent solutions. One such difficulty con-
cerns the direction of influence that utilization and maintenance exercise on the rate of 
depreciation. In this respect Boucekkine and Tamarit (2003, pp 10-16) find that when 
utilization worsens depreciation, maintenance does too. So faced with this counter-
intuitive result they are forced to impose an extra constraint, which guarantees that the 
influence of the two operating policies runs in opposite directions.  
Another difficulty stems from the observation that their model does not yield explicit 
characterizations of utilization and maintenance. For this reason, such significant ques-
tions as: how do operating policies develop in time; when and under what technical and 
market conditions do they develop from harder to softer, and vice versa; and, how and 
to what extent do they depend on the various parameters, are left unanswered. Lastly, 
one additional difficulty springs from the realization that the service life of capital, which 
constitutes a crucial determinant of operating policies, is ignored.   26
In light of these shortcomings, the models of growth and real business cycles under 
consideration stand to gain significantly from our results. More specifically, improvements 
may be pursued in at least three directions. First, by bringing the service life of capital to 
the forefront of the analysis. Focusing on terminal scrapping can accomplish this easily. 
Second, by extending the analysis to obtain determinate utilization and maintenance poli-
cies even in the case of durable capital. This may be hard to accomplish, if at all possible, 
but it is desirable because depending on market conditions the representative firm may be 
obliged at times to treat capital as durable; and thirdly, by generalizing the model to allow 
for a finite number of replacements before terminal scrapping.  
 
6.2 Capital budgeting  
  The process of capital budgeting assists decision makers in business firms and 
other organizations to resolve questions associated with investment. It deals with such 
issues as the selection of projects, the timing and the duration of investment, the deter-
mination of the amount to be invested within any given period of time, the arrangement 
of financial means necessary for the completion of projects, etc. Some of the decision 
variables involved in the process are determined endogenously, some other are consid-
ered exogenous, and still some other are taken as fixed. Table 1 below lists the most 
common decision variables in each of these three categories under the current state in 
the theory and practice of capital budgeting. 
Table 1: Endogenous, exogenous and fixed variables in capital 
budgeting under the current state of theory and practice. 
Endogenous Exogenous  Fixed 
Amount of investment  Service life  Discount rate 
Quantity of output   Duration of opportunity
1  Initial capital stock 
Quantity of inputs   Utilization rate   
Technology   Maintenance    
  Output and input prices   
 Scrap  value   
1. Duration of opportunity is the overall period over which it may be profitable to replace 
the equipment several times. 
From this we observe that presently a large number of decision variables are treated 
as exogenous, which implies that the generality of the models employed in capital 
budgeting is severely limited. On the contrary our model renders most of the variables in 
the second group endogenous. In particular, their classification in the framework of our 
model becomes as shown in Table 2.    27
Table 2: Endogenous, exogenous and fixed variables in capital budg-
eting in the framework of our model. 
 
Endogenous Exogenous  Fixed 
Amount of investment  Horizon of opportunity  Discount rate 
Quantity of output   Output and input prices  Initial capital stock 
Quantity of inputs      
Technology      
Service life     
Utilization rate     
Maintenance      
Scrap value     
 
Consequently, the gains achieved in the generalization of the standard capital 
budgeting model are substantial. Actually the generalization could be stretch even fur-
ther by allowing the horizon of opportunity to be determined endogenously. But then the 
problem would become quite cumbersome to solve. 
 
6.3 Retirement acceleration programs  
   Government policies, for example, to reduce car emissions, to increase the safety of 
passengers in coastal shipping, and to encourage switching to energy efficient tech-
nologies take the form of restrictions on the one hand to lower their service lives and on 
the other to influence the modes of their operation.  Historically in all these cases the in-
struments of intervention have been of the command and control type. But in recent 
years interested researchers and policy makers have turned their attention to models 
based on economic incentives, a classic example being the programs of accelerated 
vehicle replacement that have been adopted in many countries.  
The standard model driving these programs is described, for example, in Alberini, 
Harrington and McConnell (1995). It postulates that automobiles are replaced at equal 
time intervals over an infinite horizon and the question asked is what subsidy would the 
government have to offer in order to achieve the expected participation in the program. 
However, as it ignores the effects of utilization and maintenance on the rate of deprecia-
tion, the model is least appealing. For if the resale value of a car exceeds the bounty be-
cause it has a better than average utilization and maintenance record, contrary to the 
prediction of the model, its owner will be unwilling to participate in the program.  
Another limitation is the presumption embedded in the model that cars depreciate   28
physically and economically at a constant rate. Yet as we stressed in Bitros and Flyt-
zanis (2002a) this hypothesis has come under attack on theoretical and empirical 
grounds in the last three decades and the dominant view now is that at least it should 
be tested as in Prucha and Nadiri (1996). Hence, due to the inappropriate specifica-
tion of the depreciation rate, the model does not yield an explicit characterization of 
the determinants of terminal scrapping.   
In conclusion, the models that drive retirement acceleration programs are in need 
of extension in two directions: first, by focusing on terminal scrapping, and, secondly, 
by introducing utilization and maintenance as endogenous determinants of the de-
preciation rate. Our results contribute towards this objective by offering a consistent 
framework of analysis with a wide range of specification choices. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions. 
In this paper we pursued several objectives. One was to introduce utilization and 
maintenance in a model with terminal scrapping in order to study the properties of 
the respective policies and their interactions. Another was to gauge the nature of im-
plications that emerge for economic theory when operating and capital policies are 
integrated in an analytical framework based on rational entrepreneurial behavior. 
And still a third objective was to come up with a model, which is adequately flexible 
to facilitate further extensions, but also tractable enough to provide meaningful assis-
tance in economic applications. Below we summarize the main features of the ap-
proach we adopted to attain these objectives as well as the conclusions derived from 
our results. 
 
7.1 Main features of the model 
Drawing on our earlier research we adopted a model of utilization and mainte-
nance in which the investment opportunity lasts for a single operating period, at the 
end of which equipment is terminally scrapped. Moreover, the following features 
characterize our approach: 
1.   We introduced two measures of capital corresponding to its dual function as 
equipment and as services rendered. This allowed us to measure the dif-
ferent effect of the operations on the equipment and on the services by the 
use of a single coefficient  .  ε
2.     We introduced a single index, the total profit index,  , which summarizes  i  29
the technical characteristics of the equipment and allows us to compare the 
various policies.  
3.  We distinguished two equipment price domains. Low prices, where the short 
duration policy is profit making, and high prices, where the short duration 
policy is loss making. The critical price 
c p  separating them is determined by 
the properties of the break-even policy. 
4.   We have ascertained how the applied wear, revenue, and scrapping poli-
cies depend on the above characteristics and on the market parameters, 
particularly the discount rate   and the difference   in the rate of market 
price changes between the equipment and the services rendered. In the 
general case, we distinguished three domains of 
σ η
ση −  values:  
      (i)   Low values, where the equipment is profitable and durable for all prices. 
      (ii)  Intermediate values, where the equipment is profitable if the price is suffi-
ciently low or sufficiently high, i.e. there is an intermediate range of 
equipment prices that are not profitable, which widens as σ  increases. 
In this domain we have mixed scrapping policies, durable or scrappable, 
depending on the wear properties of the two capital measures.    
η −
      (iii)  High values, where it is profitable only for low prices, becoming lower 
as   increases.  ση −
5.  As   changes crossing these critical values, we may have sudden 
changes in the scrapping policies. These are caused mainly by the effect of 
equipment obsolescence risk on the owner.  
ση −
6.   Beside the above jumps in scrapping policy, we may have also jumps in 
operating policies to higher or lower wear/revenue rates caused by lineari-
ties in the operating functions. 
7.  We can determine conditions under which we apply extremal policies, of 
closedown, mothballing, idling, capacity depleting, or full capacity. 
 
Remark 6  
In this context It would be interesting to examine the above policies in the areas 
of real estate policies or shipping. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
Our results differ significantly from the scanty evidence on record. Foremost   30
among the differences is that utilization, maintenance and service life depend critically 
on the revenue earning properties of the equipment under consideration. By contrast the 
view propagated in the literature is that the corresponding policies are invariant with re-
spect to the type of equipment. Another distinct difference lies in that all three policies 
are determined jointly. This implies in turn that empirical models investigating their de-
terminants should allow for this simultaneity.  And still another difference has to do with 
the development of operating policies in time. In particular, optimal operating policies 
provide for decreasing (increasing) utilization and increasing (decreasing) mainte-
nance according as the discount rate for operating capital is higher (lower) than the 
discount rate of scrapping capital, but not necessarily throughout. The reason being 
that, if at least one of the functions defining the operating factors is not strictly con-
cave, there will be jumps to lower (higher) intensity policies i.e. both lower (higher) 
utilization and at the same time lower (higher) maintenance. So the puzzle in the lit-
erature that has been associated with the optimal combination of these two policy 
instruments, and which was encountered recently by Boucekkine and Tamarit 
(2003), is resolved without having to impose extra restrictions.  
    31
Appendix  A 
 
A1.  Total profit index function 
We consider equipment with increasing concave operating function:  , and 
we define the adjusted Hamiltonian flow rate function: 
rr ( w = )
 
                        h
w µ r w µw   r w µ  or  extremal () m a x { () } () ′ =− ⇒ = . 
 
It can be interpreted as the usual profit function, where the revenue  , the input w , 
and the input unit cost 
r
µ, may have any sign.  Hence it is the dual of   in the 
context of convex analysis, and as such it is convex, with linear segments at the corners 
of  , and corners at the linear segments of  .  In fact differentiating we find: 
rr w () =
rw ( ) rw ( )
 
               h(µ) h(w) w(µ) [r(w) µ(w) w µ (w) ]/µ(w) w(µ) ′′ ′ ′′ ′ == − − = − , 
 
where  w µ () −  is an increasing function of µ, constant at the corners and discontinu-
ous at the linear parts. It has minimum at the zero wear value: wµ . So 
depending on the wear properties, the graph of h
0 (0)
w r ′ =⇒ =
µ ( ) will have one of the forms in 
Figure A1, with the asymptotes:  
   
                     h(µ) r µw  as  µ −→   + ∞   and   h µ rµ w () = −   for   .  µ 0 ≤
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In each case, the position of the µ  axis where h 0 = , depends on the revenue properties. It can 
be in any one of the three positions indicated, according as the equipment is: 
      Profit making: r 0 ≥ , Loss making: r 0 ≤ , Revenue flexible: rr 0 <<. 
 
A2.  Profit index 
The slope of the radius to the graph of the function hh ( µ) =  gives the total profit index: 
 
                                                    ih µ µ () / =  
 
For  , it is always the hyperbola:  µ 0 ≤
 
                                                     ir µ w / = −  
 
For  , it depends on the revenue type of equipment. If it is revenue flexible:  µ 0 ≥
rr 0 <<, then it decreases from +∞ past the value of the asymptote with iw = − , 
reaching a minimum at the unit elasticity point, given by the zero revenue value: 
 
             h
r µ µh µ r µ µ () / () () 0 ′ =⇒ = ⇒ ,  with minimum value i
rr µ w () =− .   
 
If it is not revenue flexible, then it decreases monotonically to i =− w  if it is profit 
making: r 0 ≥ , it increases monotonically to iw = −  if it is loss making:r .  We ob-
tain the graphs in Figure 2 in the text. In each case the position of the 
0 ≤
µ axis where 
, depends on the wear properties, i.e. the signs of  i 0 =
r www {,, } .   
For given µ, the total profit index i  can also be obtained directly from the operat-
ing function   as indicated in the first diagram of Figure A2 below.     rr = ( w )  33
Conversely, from the same diagram, for given i  we can find the µ −values and the 
policies (w  with this profit index by drawing the appropriate tangent lines from the 
position   on the w axis. Thus, in the second diagram of Figure A2, we consider 
revenue flexible equipment of the special type and we find the 
,r)
i − −
µ −values and the 
policies (w  corresponding to four index values, as follows:  ,r)
1.  iw i w −< ⇒ > − : Unique profit making 
2.  
rr w wi <− < ⇒− < <− wi : Two policies, one profit and one loss making  w
3.  
rr ww i <− < ⇒− < <− wi : No policy  w
4.  wi : Extremal policy, the hardest.    i <− ⇒ <− w
The results are in accord with the third graph of Figure 2 in the text. 
 
A3.   Extremal policies  
As noted in Lemma 1, if µ becomes negative then the applied policy is the ex-
tremal hardest.  Since we don’t have disposal costs, this cannot happen at the 
terminal scrapping time. However, if r 0 ′ >  then, even if µ is positive, it can move 
below  r′ and the corresponding policy will be the extremal hardest:w . Similarly if 
r′ <∞ then µ can move above r′ and the corresponding policy will be the extre-
mal mildest w . In these cases the extremal policies are stable policies, and the 
scrapping and equilibrium policies can be extremal under certain market condi-
tions. Then it will be optimal to apply the corresponding extremal policy throughout 
the operating period. We will examine one such case. 
 
Corollary A1.  Extremal policies   
We consider scrappable equipment of the profit making type.  
1. If the extremal hardest policy is stable: 
0 r′ > . 
and both discount rates are higher than the profit index of the extremal hardest 
policy: 
 σηi(w) r / r w ′ − ≥=−   and  σ / ε i(w) r / r w ′ ≥=− , 
then the extremal hardest policy will be applied throughout the operating period.  
2. If the extremal softest policy is stable: 
r′ < ∞. 
and both discount rates are lower than the profit index of the extremal softest pol-
icy: 
 σηi(w) r / r w ′ −≤ = −  and  σ / ε i(w) r / r w ′ ≤ =− , 
then the extremal softest policy will be applied throughout the operating period.  
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A4.  Substitution rates 
We consider an equipment with operating rate functions wu ,   , and we de-
fine two substitution rates, one for each policy factor: 
m (, ) (, ) rum
 
             , decreasing in u ,   
u
u rr / w ′ = u ′ m
m
m rr / w ′ ′ = , increasing in m. 
 
Referring to Figure 1(a) in the text, we obtain two policy domains, the high intensity 








Their common boundary is the optimal path determined by the relation:  
 
u rr
m =                                                                         
    
This common ratio is the substitution rate r( w) ′ .  Thus the optimal policies are of in-
termediate intensity. However for some or even all w values one of these domains 
may be empty and then the optimal policies are on the boundary consisting of extre-
mal utilization or maintenance policies: u{ , 01 } =  or m{ , } 01 = . In this case the sub-
stitution rate is given by the substitution rate of the non-extremal policy factor.  In   35
Figure A3 we give four examples of optimal paths and corresponding operating func-
tion.  They are all of the separable type to be explained bellow. We can adjust the 
constants to obtain any revenue or wear type.  
 
A5. Separable policies 
We will consider operating rate functions with separable utilization and maintenance 
controls: 
w a(u) b(m),   r c(u) d(m) =− =−  
 
The substitution rates are also separable, each depending only on the respective policy 
factor, and monotonic by the convexity assumptions:  
 






The high and low intensity regions are determined by the inequalities: 
 
um E: r( u ) r( m )
+ ≤    and     , 
um E: r( u ) r( m )
− ≥
 
respectively. The substitution rate and the optimal path are determined by: 
 
1. rr , in the interior of the control region. 
um ( u ) r ( m ′ ==
2.  u{ , on the vertical boundaries of extremal utilization.  0 1
m , } ,  r r ( m ′ ==
3.  m{  on the horizontal boundaries of extremal maintenance.  0 1
u , } ,  r r ( u ′ ==
 
From the monotonicity properties of the two substitution rates, we conclude the following: 
Remark 6  
If the controls are separable, then in the direction of softer policies with decreasing 
wear-revenue rates, we have also decreasing utilization and increasing maintenance, 
i.e. we do not have policy movements in time, to higher or lower intensity policies.    36
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Endnotes 
                                                  
0 (, ) (, ) T S KT S K T
1   The Center for Economic Research of the Athens University of Economics and Business Science,, 
the Greek Ministry of Science and Technology, and several business concerns supported our re-
search from which the present paper derives. To all of them, as well as our colleagues Professors 
E. Magirou and S. Vassilakis, who helped us improve the paper in distinct ways, we extend our 
sincere appreciation. 
 
2   For the reasons cited in Bitros and Flytzanis (2002b) we will continue to deal with the problems 
faced by owners of equipment and relegate the analysis of those confronted by lessors to future 
research endeavors.   
 
3   An excellent survey of the literature on utilization that developed during the decades that pro-
ceeded these efforts can be found in Winston (1974). 
 
4   For a recent account of the implications and the relative size of maintenance and repair expendi-
tures see McGrattan and Schmitz (1999). 
 
5   As it can be ascertained from, say, Howe and McCabe (1983), in the theory of finance, and particu-
larly in its segment dealing with issues in capital budgeting, the relevant literature refers to scrap-
ping as asset abandonment. So the implications of the analysis undertaken below regarding 
scrapping may transcend the core area of economic theory.  
 
6   This concerns the owner of the capital stock. If he were actually leasing it, then assuming that he 
has to return it in the original state, we would have a cost term at the end of the operating period, 
and assuming no transaction costs, the net scrap value would be: 
                            SC − =−
01 (u ,m )
 
 
7   In general, softest is the policy pair:  = = 10 ,m ) ==
w
w0 >
(m ) 1 =
(u ) 1
, and hardest is the policy pair: (u . How-
ever, if the rate functions have flat sections then the operating function being increasing concave 
will have an initial vertical or a final horizontal segment in the direction of increasing  . These we 
can ignore, as non-applied. The extremal values are determined by the remaining part. 
8  In practice idling takes place for the purpose of adjusting the available productive capacity to tem-
porary shortfalls in demand. For an excellent analysis of this policy see Das (1991).  
 
9  Mothballing of equipment lasts for extended periods and is decided either because market condi-
tions are not expected to improve any time soon or because of strategic reasons (e.g. mothballing 
by Exxon Corporation of newly built plant for producing crude from shale after the first oil crisis).  
 
10   Under this policy the owner of the equipment stops completely its maintenance but continues to 
operate it at full capacity until it comes to a standstill, naturally or otherwise. This implies that 
and explains the capacity depleting nature of the policy. 
 
11  Maintenance is most intensive at times of carrying out the surveys that are mandated by regulatory 
authorities (e.g. ships and airplanes) as well as while repairing damages from major accidents. 
However, the latter are unexpected events and as such cannot be accounted for when scheduling 
the utilization of equipment. For this reason, this policy should be interpreted to imply that full 
maintenance   takes place during periods that the equipment is normally off-duty, because 
then it does not interfere with full utilization = .   
 
12  We note that these conditions are also valid if the quantities:  , are time dependent, denoting 
external influences that are predictable. Actually η itself corresponds to predictable changes in the price 
of the equipment and the services offered. 
wrση {, ,,}
0 =
13  The above applies to the case where the equipment is owned or equivalently if the decision for its ac-
quisition must be made at time τ .  If this is not the case then we must put the additional condition 
that it is not profitable to delay the acquisition. If we neglect transaction costs so that new and unused   40
                                                                                                                                                     
stock have the same value, then this restriction is given by the H −initial condition:  
       with  T HS K 0 (0) ( ,0) 0 ′ −+ < λ(0) 0 =  
ε r ση pK
1
0 max ( )
− ⇒>   −
P/E B V
iE / B V =
01 ,m )
14   As it was shown in our previous work, the notions: “scrappable, durable”, are not equivalent to the 
notions: “replaceable, non-replaceable”. In fact the two are independent. A scrappable stock may 
or may not be replaceable, the same for a durable stock. 
 
15  As in the case of profitability we take the first maximum as optimal. This could reflect a reluctance 
on the part of the operator to accept even temporary reduction in the over all net revenue, e.g. as a 
precautionary measure to the risk of capital obsolescence . Anyways we will indicate situations 
where in fact there may appear subsequent maxima. However their comparison would require ad-
ditional specifications. 
 
16 We consider the two financial indices: 
     : Price per total earnings, and P/ : price per logistic value 
    then the profit index is given by their ratio 
     : Total earnings (including stock adjustment) per logistic value. 
 
17  In general, softest is the policy pair: (u = = 10 ,m ) ==
η
, and hardest is the policy pair: (u . 
However if the rate functions have flat sections then the operating function being increasing con-
cave will have an initial vertical or a final horizontal segment in the direction of increasing w . 
These we can ignore, as non-applied. The extremal values are determined by the remaining part. 
 
18  We noted that for revenue flexible equipment some σ −  give two scrapping solutions, and then 
the scrapping duration is determined by the one closest to  , in accordance with the position that 
the operator does not accept revenue reduction, as in endnote 14 above. In this case as T in-
creases further it may meet the second scrapping solution giving a minimum, and then we will 
have a second maximum at infinite duration. Also, as we see from the graph of the profit index 
function, as σ  decreases the two 
0 µ
η − µ −values come closer together and then it is expected that 
at some point the second maximum will dominate the first. For this investigation we need more 
specifications.  
19  We address our comments to their model because it is of the latest vintage and we can avoid de-
tailed references to older models by, say, Licandro and Puch (2000) and Collard and Kollintzas 
(2000), which belong in the same class.   